EAST PALESTINE — A national safety panel was told the pressure relief valves on all tankers of vinyl chloride were functioning as they should have following the East Palestine derailment.

The National Transportation Safety Board had an in-field hearing in the East Palestine gymnasium on June 22 and 23, zeroing in on how rail car pressure release devices operated during and after the fiery Feb. 3 derailment and the condition of the tankers in the crash and fire’s aftermath.

Kareanne Stegmann of Oxy Vinyl, the company that owned 700,000 pounds of the vinyl chloride which was vented and burned; and Jeremiah Zimmer of Midland Manufacturing, manufacturer of tank car service equipment including PRDs; both testified.

They said the pressure relief valves on all tankers of vinyl chloride were functioning as they should have following the derailment.

“The pressure relief devices on all five cars operated as intended, preventing damage to the tanks by relieving the elevated pressures caused by the surrounding fires,” Stegmann testified. “From our perspective, these tank cars and their associated safety devices exhibited sound mechanical integrity and functioned as designed during the extraordinary circumstances of this incident.”

RAISED ALARMS

In testimony given in an earlier session, the 70-minute long “violent release” of pressure on one of the vinyl chloride tank cars followed by no activity on Feb. 4 raised alarms of a possible rupture. Zimmerman said the release was not a sign that the PDR was failing but rather doing its job.

“The fact that it opened means the pressure inside the tank reached start-to-discharge and expelled a large quality of fluid from the tank, decreasing the volume and decreasing the pressure,” Zimmerman testified. “It may have receded and not returned to that start-to-discharge pressure. That’s within its normal function.”

At least two of pressure release valve stems, however, were found to be stuck closed during post-derailment evaluation. When asked about value stem capability with venting of vinyl chloride, Zimmerman said that Midland Manufacturing does not specify compatibility with certain chemicals.

“We can only provide an array of materials and it’s up to the customer, and ultimately the shipper, before that commodity enters the tank,” Zimmerman said, before conceding that several of the valve stems “were stuck inside the top guides” following the event.

Both Stegmann and Zimmerman went on to testify the vent and burn could have caused the damage to the valves. Earlier testimony suggested the valves may have “gummed up.”

TANK DURABILITY

The NTSB also put overall tank durability under the proverbial microscope — specifically DOT 111 tank cars.

“First you want to prevent a tragedy, but second you want to minimize the damage and that’s what we are talking about — stronger tank cars,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy explained.

The vinyl chloride tankers (cars 28, 29, 30, 31 and 55) that were vented and burned were DOT-105J’s. According to Randy Keltz, manager of Tank Car Safety Programs for the Federal Railroad Administration, none of the vinyl chloride tank cars sustained “any mechanically breaching or damage to the vessel itself during the derailment.”

Keltz has managed FRA’s regulatory oversight and enforcement for railroad tank car safety in the United States since 2015. It was the same year that the FRA and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration announced the phasing out of the DOT-111 designs which are required to be out of flammable service or retrofitted by 2029. The Rail Safety Act of 2023 would expedite that deadline to 2025.

Fifteen DOT-111’s were involved in the East Palestine derailment, including five that were breached. Of the five damaged 111’s, three were hauling hazardous materials.

Car 36 suffered significant outlet valve damage and the tank head was cracked. That car spilled its entire load of 25,000 gallons of ethylene glycol monobutyl ether.

Car 50, which was punctured and burned out, also lost its entire contents (30,000 gallons of butyl acrylates) and Car 38 suffered cracks and punctures, leading to the partial loss of 2-ethylhexyl acrylate.

Of those three hazardous material cars, only one — No. 50 — was considered “flammable” and would have been impacted by the pending phase-out mandate.

When asked by Homendy if the phase-out proposal would consider expanding beyond flammable liquids, William Schoonover, PHMSA associate administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, said they are contemplating an expansion but it has been put forward to date.

“The reason I’m asking is because we can’t mislead communities after derailments in making proposals that don’t directly go to the cause,” Homendy said. “We’re talking one tank car out of 149 cars.”

PHASING OUT

The NTSB is on record of phasing out all DOT 111’s in hazardous materials transportation. Keltz said the FRA would like to see that as well but said it is easier said than done, referring to DOH-111’s as “50-year assets” and testifying that railroads are hesitant to do so before getting their money’s worth.

“I can’t disagree. That is a goal we would like to have but we have to do it in a certain manner, because we do have to weigh the costs and benefits,” Keltz said. “We have to do it in a way that’s going to get those regulations through. I would really love for the industry to step up and do it all on their own.”

Homendy asked Keltz to weigh a different cost calculation.

“What does the department of transportation consider a cost of a life today in your cost analysis?” she asked before answering the question herself. “It’s $9.6 million. That’s what it is. Lives are priceless to us.”