IRAQ WAR Saddam reportedly got 'secret' tips
One report suggests the tips did more harm than good for Saddam.
WASHINGTON (AP) -- In his struggle to figure out and foil the American invasion plan as it was unfolding in late March and early April 2003, Saddam Hussein may have fielded a few tips from an old ally: the Russian government.
But it seems possible the Russians' "help" created more confusion than clarity for the clueless Iraqi leader.
As described in a lengthy report released Friday at the Pentagon, Iraqi documents captured by U.S. troops say the Russians collected information about U.S. troop movements and battle plans at the outset of the invasion by tapping sources inside the American military. And they say the intelligence was passed to Saddam.
More harm than good
But was the information useful? In at least one case, the Pentagon report suggests it did more harm than good for Saddam. In fact it may have reinforced in Saddam's mind a mistaken impression about the timing of the U.S. ground assault into Baghdad -- an impression that permitted U.S. forces to preserve an element of surprise.
Referring to a Russian letter to Saddam that claimed the Russians had sources inside the U.S. Central Command, which planned and executed the invasion, the Pentagon report said, "Such external sources of information were only one of the fog-generators obscuring the minds of Iraq's senior leadership."
That letter was dated March 24, five days into the war.
The unclassified Pentagon report does not assess the value or accuracy of the information Saddam got or offer details on Russia's information pipeline. It cites captured Iraqi documents that say the Russians had "sources inside the American Central Command" and that intelligence was passed to Saddam through the Russian ambassador.
Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for Russia's U.N. mission in New York, said the allegations were false.
Unclear on sources
The Iraqi documents leave unclear who may have been the sources at Central Command's war-fighting headquarters, which is at Camp As Saliyah just outside Doha, the capital of Qatar. No Russians were authorized to be at the closely guarded base.
A classified version of the report, titled "Iraqi Perspectives Project," is not being made public. It was assembled by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which reviewed a vast array of captured Iraqi documents and interviewed Iraqi political and military leaders, not including Saddam.
Among the information the Iraqis said they received from the Russians:
U That the movement of U.S. troops into southern Iraq from Kuwait was a diversion. (In fact it was the main avenue of attack, supported by special forces entering from Jordan and paratroopers flying into northern Iraq.)
U That the ground assault on Baghdad would not begin until the Army's 4th Infantry Division was in place, around April 15. (In fact, the 4th Infantry, whose originally planned invasion route from Turkey was blocked by the Turkish government, was not yet on Iraqi territory when the Baghdad ground assault began April 7. Thus, by design or chance, the information from the Russians actually reinforced a U.S. military deception effort.)
U That the main focus of U.S. ground forces moving toward Baghdad from the southwest was the area around the city of Karbala. (This was true. After crossing a bridge over the Euphrates River outside Karbala, the 3rd Infantry Division had a clear path to the Iraqi capital and Saddam's chances of stopping the assault had ended.)